1 2 3 4 5 6 7	HARVEY ROSENFIELD, ESQ. (SBN 123082) PAMELA M. PRESSLEY, ESQ. (SBN 180362) THE PROPOSITION 103 ENFORCEMENT PRO THE FOUNDATION FOR TAXPAYER AND CO 1750 Ocean Park Boulevard, Suite 200 Santa Monica, California 90405 Tel. (310) 392-0522 Fax (310) 392-8874 Attorneys for The Proposition 103 Enforcement Project, a Project The Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Right	NSUMER RIGHTS
8 9	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
10	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES	
11) G N DG 010400
12	FLOYD MITCHELL, GRACIELA VIRGEN, MARGARET CARMONA, and VIRGINIA THOMPSON, individuals, on Behalf of) Case No. BC 212492)) NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS AND
13	Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated,) OBJECTIONS OF THE) PROPOSITION 103 ENFORCMENT
14	Plaintiffs,) PROJECT TO SETTLEMENT) AGREEMENT
15	v.)) Hearing Date: May 16, 2001
16 17	ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, and DOES 1 through 100, Inclusive) Time: 8:30 a.m.) Dept. No: 59
18	Defendants.	
19		_/
20	TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEY	'S OF RECORD:
21	Please take notice that the Proposition 103 Enforcement Project hereby objects to the	
23	proposed settlement agreement entered into by the parties on or about April 9, 2001. Appearing	
24	by counsel at the hearing for preliminary approval of the proposed settlement on April 23, 2001,	
25	the Proposition 103 Enforcement Project ("Prop 103 Project") requested and the court granted an	
26	opportunity for objections to the proposed settleme	nt to be filed by Prop 103 Project. The court
27	set a briefing schedule and hearing date for May 16, 2001. The court postponed entry of its	
28	ruling granting preliminary approval of the parties' settlement pending the May 16 hearing. Prop	
	OBJECTIONS BY PROPOSITION 103 ENFORCEMENT PROJECT TO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT	
	OBJECTIONS BY PROPOSITION 103 ENFORCEMEN	T PROJECT TO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

1	103 Project's objections are based on the arguments set forth below, and upon such further
2	argument and evidence as may be presented to this court.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This litigation seeks to end Allstate's practice of overcharging previously uninsured motorists, in violation of Insurance Code §1861.02(c), enacted by California voters through the 1998 ballot initiative known as Proposition 103. After extensive review of the parties' settlement agreement entered into on or about April 9, 2001 (hereinafter "Settlement Agreement"), and the proposed "Persistency Discount" rule, attached as Exhibit 2 thereto, the Proposition 103 Enforcement Project (hereinafter "Prop 103 Project"), objects to the Settlement Agreement on the grounds that:

- 1) the proposed rule continues to violate Cal. Ins. Code §1861.02(c) by imposing a higher automobile insurance premium on previously uninsured motorists, allowing Allstate to engage in the same unlawful conduct under another rubric; and
- 2) approval of the proposed rule by the California Department of Insurance (CDI) would violate prior writs issued by the San Francisco Superior Court mandating that the Commissioner not approve such rating factors in any insurance company's class plan.

By letter dated May 4, 2001, the Project has requested that the CDI act immediately to initiate a rulemaking proceeding that would determine whether the "Initially Persistent" discount proposed by Allstate and plaintiffs' counsel or any other rating factor that violates Ins. Code §1861.02(c) can be used by any company. Pending this rulemaking proceeding, the parties' settlement agreement should not be approved in its present form.

Prop 103 Project therefore respectfully requests that this court find, as a matter of law, that Section IIIB of the Settlement Agreement and the "Initially Persistent" rating rule as contained in Exhibit 2 of the Settlement Agreement violates §1861.02(c), deny approval of any settlement by the parties that contains such a rule, and direct the CDI to not approve any rating factor that violates §1861.02(c). In the alternative, the Project requests that the Court deny plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement pending the outcome of an administrative rulemaking proceeding by the CDI.

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A. The Proposition 103 Enforcement Project and Proposition 103.

The Proposition 103 Enforcement Project ("Prop 103 Project") is a project of the non-profit Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights (FTCR). FTCR's Prop 103 Project has been actively involved in the implementation of Proposition 103 and related insurance reform matters in numerous administrative and legal proceedings. Prop 103 Project's attorneys and advocates challenge excessive rates and unjust industry practices; monitor the industry and issue reports, pursue reforms, and oppose anti-consumer legislation sponsored by the insurance lobby.

In order to address the failure of insurers to service particular communities, principally in predominantly low-income, urban areas, Proposition 103 sought to diminish the importance of geography and place primary emphasis on driving record and individual driving habits. See Cal. Ins. Code § 1861.02(a). Mandating the use of new rating factors, however, does not address the practical reality that the availability of insurance agents and brokers is extremely circumscribed in some communities. 1 To ensure that qualified drivers can obtain insurance regardless of where they live, Proposition 103 further specifies that any good driver, as defined in the initiative, has the right to purchase an auto insurance policy from the insurer of his or her choice. See Cal. Ins. Code § 1861.02(b)(1). The absence of prior insurance coverage cannot disqualify an otherwise good driver from obtaining the good driver discount, nor can it be used by insurers as a criterion in and of itself for rates or premiums generally. See Cal. Ins. Code §1861.02(b)(3)(C) and (c). It is this last-mentioned provision of Proposition 103, §1861.02(c), that plaintiffs in this class action lawsuit seek to enforce.

¹ See Khalid Al-Faris, California Dep't Of Insurance, Selling And Servicing Levels Of Private Passenger Auto Liability In Urban Cities (1993).

B. Writs Issued by Superior Court Prohibit Commissioner from Approving Class Plans that Violate §1861.02(c).

In 1996, FTCR and other consumer groups challenged other insurance companies' violations of §1861.02(c). See Proposition 103 Enforcement Project v. Quackenbush (Super. Ct. S.F. County, 1997, No. 982646) and Consumers Union and Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Quackenbush (Super. Ct. S.F. County, 1997, No. 982181). Those actions evolved from Commissioner Quackenbush's denials of requests for hearings by Prop 103 Project to challenge Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois's ("Safeco's") Class Plan (PA-96-0070-00) and by Consumers Union and Southern Christian Leadership Conference to challenge the Class Plan of the Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club. The approved class plans implemented rules allowing a surcharge on drivers who could not verify compliance with the state's financial responsibility law. The San Francisco Superior Court issued writs in both lawsuits against Commissioner Quackenbush on February 10, 1997, which prohibit the Commissioner from approving the use of any rating factor requiring proof of compliance with the mandatory insurance laws (prior insurance coverage). See Peremptory Writs of Mandate in Case Nos. 982181 and 982646 attached hereto as Exhibit A.

C. Administrative Challenges by Consumer Groups to Allstate's Rule 39 "Non-Verifiable Accident Record Surcharge".

In 1997, FTCR's Proposition 103 Enforcement Project and other groups initiated administrative proceedings before the California Department of Insurance on the Class Plan Applications of State Farm, Farmers, and Allstate. (File Nos. PA-97-0077-00, PA-97-0079-00, and PA-97-0078-00.) Those proceedings were bifurcated into two phases. Phase I sought to determine whether the companies were in compliance with Ins. Code § 1861.02(a)'s requirement that premiums be based primarily on factors related to driving history as implemented through Quackenbush's factor weighting regulations. After the Department upheld insurers' interpretation of the law and regulations, consumer groups petitioned for a writ of mandate in Alameda County Superior Court challenging the Quackenbush factor weighting regulations. That issue has recently completed its course through the courts, ending in a denial of review by

the California Supreme Court in *Spanish Speaking Citizens Foundation, et al. v. Quackenbush* (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1179, review den. March 28, 2001, leaving in place the Court of Appeal's decision upholding the Quackenbush automobile insurance factor weighting regulations.

Phase II of those proceedings was to determine, among other issues, the validity of Allstate's Rule 39, the "non-verifiable accident driving record surcharge." In determining Incident Surcharge Rating and Good Driver Discount Eligibility, Allstate's Rule 39 operates to impose a "non-verifiable accident record" surcharge on all new applicants who cannot show acceptable written verification of their accident record for the prior three years. Overall, drivers who cannot show acceptable verification would end up paying approximately 50-60% more than those who can show acceptable verification. Acceptable verification must be:

- A letter of experience from the driver's current/prior insurance carrier(s);
- A renewal offer from the driver's current insurance carrier; or
- BOTH OF THE FOLLOWING:
 - o The driver's signed certification; and
 - An acceptable form of written verification of an accident record for the most
 recent 18 months from a disinterested third party, including but not limited to:
 - A letter from the driver's employer (applies to driver who has been driving company car for the past 18 months)
 - A letter from the driver's commanding officer in the military (listing driving accident history for previous 18 months or stating driver had not been driving a vehicle for the last 18 months)
 - A letter from the driver's Peace Corps supervisor, U.S. Foreign Service or similar organization (listing driving accident history for previous 18 months or stating driver had not been driving a vehicle for the last 18 months)

A letter from the current insurance carrier of the driver's parents stating the driver was a rated driver on the parents' policy for the last 18 months that lists the driver's accident history for the most recent 18 months.

The Rule 39 surcharge applies only to new business. If the surcharge is applied, it will be applied for 36 months from the date the policy is issued. While Motor Vehicle Records can be used to verify violations, Motor Vehicle Records are not an acceptable form of written verification of an accident record for purposes of Rule 39.

In raising this issue in its administrative petition for hearing on the class plans, the Proposition 103 Enforcement Project argued, as plaintiffs have in this case, that Rule 39 violated §1861.02(c) by using the absence of prior insurance as a basis to charge previously uninsured motorists higher premiums. A hearing on Phase II has yet to be noticed by the Department.

D. The Mitchell Proceedings.

In the interim, the present private litigation was instituted to challenge Allstate's Rule 39. Plaintiffs in this class action, *Mitchell et al. v. Allstate*, LASC Case No. BC 212492, filed on June 24, 1999 alleged that the defendant's Rule 39 violates §1861.02(c); plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief.

By mutual agreement of the parties, the litigation was stayed pending a hearing and decision by the CDI on the question of whether Rule 39 violates the statute in the concurrently filed administrative complaint (*In the Matter of the Complaint of Mitchell et al. v. Allstate*, IH-00-0097-91), under the putative authority of the primary jurisdiction doctrine set forth in *Farmers v. Superior Court* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 477. The CDI held an informal hearing on March 14, 2000. The CDI did not notify the parties in Phase II of the prior Class Plan challenges of that fact. The parties to IH-00-0097-91 filed post-hearing briefs and comments with the CDI in April and May 2000.

At some date, unknown to Prop 103 Project, the parties informed the CDI that they intended to settle the class action litigation, and the CDI agreed to withhold issuance of its

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decision on the matter and allow parties instead to proceed with submitting their settlement agreement to the court for approval.

FTCR subsequently learned through plaintiffs counsel that the parties entered into a settlement agreement on or about April 9, 2001 which would:

- 1. Require Allstate to discontinue the use of its Rule 39 surcharge an action which is superfluous as noted below given the Department's emergency regulation.
- 2. Permit Allstate to utilize a new so-called "Initially Persistent" Discount rule. Allstate's proposed "Initially Persistent" Discount would require motorists applying for an insurance policy with Allstate to provide proof of insurance with a single carrier for the previous 12 months in order to receive an approximately 11% discount. Acceptable proof of prior "persistency" for purposes of receiving Allstate's discounted premium include:
 - A letter of experience;
 - Automobile insurance identification cards;
 - Automobile insurance declarations pages; or
 - Automobile insurance renewal offers.
- 3. In lieu of damages, require Allstate to issue "coupons" to those drivers who were improperly surcharged under Rule 39; the coupons provide discounts for future purchases of Allstate insurance products.

E. Department of Insurance Issues Emergency Regulation that Would Invalidate **Rule 39.**

On April 9, 2001, the Department issued a notice of a proposed emergency regulation (File No. ER-41) that would prohibit insurance companies from requiring proof of insurance to verify driving history, effectively nullifying Allstate's Rule 39. (A copy of the Notice of Proposed Emergency Action, File No. ER-41, is attached hereto as Exhibit B.) The emergency regulation has yet to be submitted to the Office of Administrative Law. Whether this would moot out the administrative proceedings in Phase II of the 1997 class plan challenges referenced above and in In the Matter of the Complaint of Mitchell et al. v. Allstate, IH-00-0097-91 is

unclear. The question of relief to policyholders who were surcharged under Rule 39, at the very least remains outstanding and should be determined by the Department.

F. Court Grants Leave for Prop 103 Project to File Objections to Settlement Agreement.

By appearance of its attorneys on April 23, 2001 at the hearing on preliminary approval of the settlement agreement in the present litigation, the Proposition 103 Enforcement Project requested and the court granted it leave to file objections to the settlement. The court then set a briefing schedule for Prop 103 Project to file its objections and for the parties to reply and set a hearing date for April 16, 2001.

III. ARGUMENT

In determining whether to approve a class action settlement, courts have broad discretion to determine whether the settlement is "fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned." *See Dunk v. Ford Motor Company* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801. Because of the instant Settlement Agreement's discriminatory impact not only on members of the class, but on the broader 20-25% of drivers who are currently uninsured due to the unavailability and unaffordability of automobile insurance, because the proposed "Initially Persistent" rating rule violates §1861.02(c), and because approval of the proposed rule by the CDI would violate prior writs issued by the San Francisco Superior Court, this court should exercise its discretion to find that the Settlement Agreement is indeed unfair, unreasonable, and inadequate to all concerned. *See id.*

A. Allstate's Proposed "Initially Persistent" Discount Violates Ins. Code §1861.02(c).

Proposition 103, Ins. Code §1861.02(c), specifies that:

the absence of prior automobile insurance coverage, in and of itself, shall not be a criterion for determining eligibility

¹ California Department of Insurance, 1998 Commissioner's Report on Underserved Communities available on CDI's Web site at http://www.insurance.ca.gov/docs/FS-Studies.htm.

for a Good Driver Discount policy, or generally for automobile rates, premiums or insurability.

Allstate's proposed "Persistency Discount" would create different rating schedules for "Initially Persistent" Drivers and for "Non-Persistent" Drivers. *See* Exhibit 2 to Settlement Agreement at p 1-2 (Section IA1, "Rating of Initially Persistent, New Business Rating" and Section IB1, "Rating of Non-Persistent, New Business Rating"). A driver applying for a new policy with Allstate will be classified as "Initially Persistent" and given a discount (approximately 11%) if he or she "has maintained continuous automobile insurance coverage with a single insurance company or single insurance group for at least the one year period immediately prior to the new business effective date" of the Allstate policy if acceptable documentation is shown, including, but not limited to:

- A letter of experience;
- Automobile identification cards;
- Automobile insurance declarations pages; or
- Automobile insurance renewal offers.

Drivers classified as "Non-Persistent", those who could not show proof of persistency with one carrier for the past twelve months, would not be eligible for any discount for at least one year from the effective date of the new policy.

There is no denying that all people who apply for insurance with Allstate who did not have insurance at any time in the previous 12 months would be excluded from receiving the "Initially Persistent" discount. Under Allstate's Rule 39, all previously uninsured drivers would have had a surcharge applied to their premium. Under the proposed new rule, all previously uninsured drivers will likewise be charged higher rates solely because they did not have prior insurance – they will not be eligible for an approximately 11% discount that previously insured motorists will receive. Thus, two consumers – otherwise identical – would be charged different rates solely because one had prior insurance and one did not. While the proposed new rule may narrow the gap somewhat in terms of how much more previously uninsured motorists will pay than other drivers, that does not save the new rule from violating §1861.02(c). A "discount" for

previously insured obviously carries the same penalty as a "surcharge" for the previously uninsured. The fact remains that consumers will be charged a higher rate solely because they did not have prior insurance. That is exactly the result that §1861.02(c) prohibits.

Plaintiffs and Allstate may argue that §1861.02(c) is not violated by the proposed new rule because people without prior insurance are not the only ones who are penalized. Those new policyholders who had insurance in the last 12 months, but were not consistently with the same carrier for those 12 months, would also not be entitled to the discount. Since a small group of people (those who patronized more than one company in the last twelve months) are penalized along with the entire group of previously uninsured applicants who would not receive the discount, plaintiffs and Allstate will argue that it is not the lack of prior insurance "in and of itself" that is the criterion on which the discount is based.

This argument is no more than a linguistic subterfuge in order to avoid the clear meaning of §1861.02(c). There is no doubt that Allstate's Rule 39 surcharge operated to charge all previously uninsured motorists more for their auto insurance premiums solely because they could not show proof of prior insurance. The only question is whether the change in *language* in Allstate's newly proposed rule cures that defect. As illustrated above, it does not do so.

B. Approval of the Proposed "Initially Persistent" Discount Would Violate A Prior Writ of Mandate.

This Court must not approve the settlement of the parties when two previously-issued superior court writs bar the Insurance Commissioner from approving rating factors that require proof of compliance with the state's financial responsibility law as proposed by the parties here. Here, Allstate is requiring proof of prior insurance (i.e., proof of compliance with the financial responsibility law) in order for new applicants to be eligible for its "Initially Persistent" discount. Approval by the Commissioner of Allstate's rule, therefore, would violate the prior writs issued in 1997 by the San Francisco Superior Court in *Proposition 103 Enforcement Project v. Chuck Quackenbush*, Case No. 982646 and *Consumers Union and Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Quackenbush*, Case No. 982181 which command the Commissioner "not to

approve financial responsibility compliance rating factors in determining rates and premiums for automobile insurance coverage absent [the Commissioner's] adoption of such factors by regulation in accordance with Insurance Code §1861.02(a)(4)" and "to notify all California private passenger automobile insurers that the use of a financial responsibility compliance factor will not be permissible." *See* Peremptory Writs of Mandate attached hereto as Exhibit A.

Allstate will likely argue that its proposed rule is a rating factor that has been adopted by regulation because "persistency" is one of the factors enumerated in Cal. Code Regs. §2632.5.

Just because Allstate is calling its newly proposed rule a "Persistency Discount," however, does not mean that it is the same "persistency" factor that is allowed under, but nowhere defined in, the regulations adopted by former Insurance Commissioner Quackenbush. Regardless of the label, the proposed rule acts to surcharge previously uninsured motorists and cannot be approved by the Commissioner when it has the result of requiring compliance with California's financial responsibility law. See id.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Prop 103 Project respectfully requests that this court find, as a matter of law, that the parties' proposed rule violates §1861.02(c), deny approval of the class action settlement agreement and direct the Insurance Commissioner not to approve any rating factor that requires the proof of no prior insurance in violation of §1861.02(c). In the alternative, Prop 103 Project requests that the court deny preliminary approval of the settlement and stay any further proceedings on this matter until such time as the California Department of Insurance has taken the following actions:

Under the Administrative Procedures Act, any standards of general application that the Department uses to define "persistency" in the class plan approval process are themselves required to be adopted by regulation. See Cal. Gov't. Code §11340.5. ("No state agency shall issue, utilize, enforce, or attempt to enforce any guideline, criterion, bulletin, manual, instruction, order, standard of general application, or other rule, . . . unless the guideline, criterion, bulletin, manual, instruction, order, standard of general application, or other rule, has been adopted as a regulation and filed with the Secretary of State" pursuant to the APA.)